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1 Introduction
In writing on the structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn (1970) introduces the notion
of a paradigm or a disciplinary matrix. While he uses these terms very loosely, so that
their meaning (and value) remains vague, they have entered into common use as a
way of locating social and cultural aspects of scientific research. Kuhn developed the
notion of a paradigm to argue that scientific knowledge progresses by a process of
punctuated evolution, in which periods of stability (or normal science) are interrupted
by periods of revolution in which new paradigms develop and replace existing ones.
We might compare this with the similarly fashionable idea of the meme, suggested by
Dawkins (1976) as a carrier of social information. A disciplinary matrix would then
be a set of memes capable of self-replication through the teaching and practice of a
scientific discipline.
Kuhn argues that distinct paradigms are incommensurable, so that scientists will tend
strongly to accept one and reject all others. In this regard Weinberg (1998) suggests
that Kuhn was particularly heavily influenced by his work on Aristotelian physics,
which as a system is very different from the Newtonian system. The two systems have
very different purposes, very different modes of enquiries, apply different forms of
reasoning and admit different forms of evidence. The unity and integrity of the
Aristotelian system may disintegrate in the face of questioning motivated by a
Newtonian understanding of physics, but it remains stable within its own domain.
1.1 The theological accommodation of commercial activity
The recollection of Aristotle at this point is wholly intentional. The campaign for debt
cancellation was coordinated by an organization called Jubilee 2000. The initial call
came largely from people within the churches, looking back to the Levitical code, in
which the fiftieth and final year of a cycle was marked by the cancellation of all
outstanding debts. Motivated by theological understandings of economic activity, they
approach the problem of debt cancellation in a way that is entirely foreign to anyone
steeped in the principles of neoclassical economics. In this theological tradition of
thinking about economic activity, exchange is not only a social activity, but also
possesses moral dimensions, often accompanied by the creation of mutual obligations.
Such ways of thinking about exchange relations are of course prevalent in other
disciplines. Sociologists such as Mauss (1954) argue that exchange in many cultures
involves a sense of mutual obligation, so that conventional economic analysis is not
necessarily the best way to analyse exchange relations.1
When we turn to Christian teaching on economic matters, we may note the argument
of Viner (1977) that at least in the period since Christianity became the official
                                                
1 In the development of classical thought, Vivenza (1997) examines the evolution of the notion of
benevolence in the Greek concept of euergesia, originally the ‘beneficence’ of the provision of corn
to a city. Such a benefactor would be granted recognition for his service to the polis through the
gratitude of the populace, as well as through payment. Aristotle extended the scope of this concept
considerably, arguing that a man who is either rich or of high status should exercise euergesia
through friendship with poorer or socially inferior friends. The calculation here was not simply
utilitarian in nature. Beneficent action would be prompted by benevolent feeling for the other party,
with a relationship of mutual dependence subsisting between the two parties. Roman authors such
as Cicero similarly emphasized the nature of benevolence within the patron-client relation.2
religion of the Roman empire, it has gradually accommodated itself to an increasingly
wide range of commercial practices. For example, Augustine, on the authority of one
(mistranslated) verse of Psalm 71, argued that the divine law forbade Christians from
participating in trade that is, the practice of buying a good at one price and selling it at
another. He also followed the prohibition on usury very precisely. Perlman (1997)
suggests that Aquinas, relying upon Aristotelian reasoning, limited the prohibition,
specifying three ways of charging effectively for the use of money.2 Again, following
Viner, we may note a further relaxation, with the prohibition of usury being
abandoned in Catholic manuals of casuistics by the middle of the seventeenth century,
with neither Jansenists nor Jesuits believing that it could be sustained.
In saying that the church has found it necessary to accommodate a range of business
practices, we should also note that the church’s teaching evolves, so that while there
may be substantial adaptation of the teaching of earlier generations, there is also a
considerable degree of continuity and appeal to earlier, particularly Scriptural,
authority in all arguments. There may now be toleration of lending at interest, but the
deepest currents in church doctrine tend to be Augustinian or Thomist in nature with,
on occasion, more than a nodding recognition of Marx (or less frequently Smith). As a
result, it is possible for a theologian to adopt the analysis of the role of money in
society developed by, for example, Aristotle and Aquinas. To an economist trained in
the methods of the neo-classical paradigm, such as Viner, such arguments are simply
meaningless, depending as they do upon a distinction between natural wealth and
created objects in the form of coinage.3
Thus we see between the forms of argument used within economics and theology
something of the degree of incommensurability to which Kuhn pointed. A physical
scientist such as Weinberg (1998) might be able to dismiss Kuhn’s arguments as
‘wormwood’ because of their denial that science proceeds towards an objective truth.
But economists perhaps do not have quite the same grounds to claim that the
regularities that they observe are independent of their conceptions of social structures.
Christian theologians tend to subordinate economic relations to both the social and the
created order. They, therefore, question the implicit instrumentalist assumption of
much economics that growth is necessarily associated with increased well-being.
2 Debt contracts as moral obligations
A party entering into a debt contract agrees that repayments of principal (and interest)
should follow a specified schedule. The word debt, derived from the Latin verb
debere which we might translate either as ‘to have to’ or ‘to be obliged to’ suggests
that these repayments are an obligation on the part of the borrower. It is consistent
with this moral perspective on the nature of loan contracts that the name given to the
lender, ‘creditor’, is derived from the verb credere meaning either ‘to believe’, or
                                                
2 Insurance against loss, payment for loss of opportunity to gain, compensation for consumption
foregone.
3 Aristotelian analysis does not seem to admit even the possibility of the creation of fiat money, and
there is a theological current that is critical of fractional reserve banking purely, it seems because
the money stock has debt, rather than tangible assets, as a counterpart.3
perhaps more appropriately ‘to entrust.’ For these reasons, it is often argued that
breaching the trust implicit in a loan contract should lead to the imposition of severe
sanctions. In German law, for example, writing a cheque on an account that lacks the
funds to meet it entitles the payee of the cheque to sue for sequestration of the
drawer’s assets. Similarly, we tend to talk about a creditor who has chosen not to
pursue a right to repayment as ‘forgiving’ the debt.
A term with slightly less moral force is more usually used in the context of the HIPC
Initiative, which refers to ‘debt relief.’ This is used by authors such as Sachs et al.
(1999), Easterly (1999) and Allen and Weinhold (2000). Yet members of the Jubilee
2000 Coalition have argued that even ‘relief’ has moral connotations inappropriate to
the situation facing many countries. They find it condescending to suggest that rich
countries should claim to be lifting a burden from the shoulders of poor ones that
could not otherwise be shifted. Campaigners prefer the term ‘debt cancellation’,
which we use throughout this paper to emphasize that the proposed action is simply
the variation of terms of a contract.
2.1 Usury: the obligations of the lender
The Christian tradition of opposition to the taking of interest on loans, relies, as noted
above, both upon Scriptural injunctions such as Exodus 22: 25, Leviticus 25: 35-37
and Deuteronomy 23: 19-20, and also upon the Aristotelian argument that lending at
interest involves the increase of money from money. Since money is artificial, and
created by man, such an increase is against nature.
This Aristotelian objection is very easy to counter in terms of modern economic
theory, relying as it does upon a confusion of the concepts of money and wealth.
People choose to hold a part of their wealth in the form of money because in that way
they are able to obtain liquidity services that other forms of wealth do not permit.
Lending, therefore, constitutes a transfer of wealth or resources, not simply a transfer
of money. Define one object of economic activity as being the creation of new
resources, or more generally value, from existing resources.4 For example, a country
borrows money to fund a programme that will provide villages with secure supplies of
clean water. The value created comes principally through the reduction in disease,
which permits the generation of wealth through various channels as well as raising
what might be called social capital.
We consider that this increase in resources resulting from the use of other resources
can also be used to justify the payment of interest, and to make a distinction between
a fair reward for willingness to supply the resources necessary to the completion of a
project, and lending that is usurious. Note that the injunction against usury in Exodus
appears in the context of Israel being identified as a chosen, holy, separate people,
while in Leviticus it is associated with a reminder of the experience of slavery in
Egypt. Reminders that the Israelites’ wealth is the result of God’s undeserved favour
(and a sign of their being chosen by God as a people) appear frequently in the Law, as
                                                
4 In a separate paper, Mochrie (2001), I have examined this question at rather greater length in the
context of a critical reading of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, considering in particular
why Antonio, a trader, is considered virtuous, while Shylock, a necessary adjunct to his trade, is
not.4
a commentary on injunctions to use that wealth appropriately. Thus in the year of
Jubilee, land was to be returned to families (Leviticus 25). The edges of fields were
not be gleaned, so that the poor might take something for themselves (Deuteronomy
24). The security taken for a loan should not be excessive (Deuteronomy 24). And
where an Israelite has had to enter into debt slavery, because of inability to pay off
debts, this should be limited in time, and the slave treated well when he is released
(Deuteronomy 15). Wealth was not to be used to oppress, but to liberate the
oppressed, for otherwise it would be lost over time.
Perlman (1997), writing within a Jewish context, argues that these prescriptions were
at the level of tort, designed to prevent the fraying of fellowship within society.
Northcott (1996), applying them to a rather more modern context, relates them to the
fragility of the land itself. Unless it was nurtured carefully, its fertility would soon be
exhausted, and these rules were attempts to remind people of the need for restraint.
These rather different analyses need not be in conflict. In the context of a largely
agrarian society, the prohibition of usury can be understood in terms of the limited
opportunities to increase social wealth through commercial activity. Monetization and
market-oriented economic activity would have been at very low levels, with most
people relying upon their own land to subsist. Wealth and well-being were associated
particularly with access to land, and this identification of the people with the land
appears in many places throughout the history of Israel.5 We can understand this
relation in terms of the covenant relation between God and Israel being expressed
through the granting of possession of the land, with an inheritance being given to each
family. Alternatively, we can understand it as a pragmatic response to the wealth of
the community being held principally through land, and a set of rules to try to ensure
stability.
Extending the theological commentary, we note that some commentators argue that
Deuteronomy was written some time after Leviticus. Gorringe (1994) uses this to
explain the quite different treatments of Sabbath year regulations in Leviticus 25 and
Deuteronomy 15. Whereas the earlier rules were expressed in terms of land pledged
as the security for an obligation, the later ones seem to relate to people who did not
possess land and whose main asset was their labour. There is also a distinction made
between the redemption rules for land and those for buildings in a town. These
suggest an awareness that in order to enjoy full human dignity, people need the degree
of autonomy that comes from having a minimum level of wealth. Freedom entails
command of sufficient resources to subsist and to be able to be accepted as a full
member of the community, if not to live in luxury.
In these conditions of limited market based activity, suppose that a farmer’s crop fails
and that he approaches a neighbour to borrow grain to enable him to sow again, but
that the neighbour, taking advantage of the desperate need of the first farmer, agrees
on condition that he will receive a large proportion of the subsequent crop as a
repayment. Such a loan is not being made so that a project is undertaken that will
benefit society. Rather, it is essentially exploitation of someone facing temporary
difficulties. This is the sort of behaviour that the Law condemns. Theologians who
                                                
5 For example, the daughters of Zelophedad in Numbers 35, Boaz in Ruth 4, Ahab and Naboth in
1 Kings 21, and the purchase of the field at Anathoth in Jeremiah 32.5
have written on the need for debt cancellation identify elements of such exploitation
of need in the lending relationships between rich and poor countries.
2.2 Theological perspectives on sovereign indebtedness
This theological call for debt cancellation begins from the proposition that property
rights are contingent, and dependent upon their being used appropriately in order to be
legitimate. It also points to the use of language that treats debtors as being responsible
for their own conditions as a source of difficulty. Most importantly, it tries to remind
economists that beneath the formality of economic theory and analysis, there is great
human suffering.
In a quite remarkable, rigorous questioning of the role of economic theory in public
policy, Jenkins (2000) has argued that the concept of ‘the market’ has been idolized in
that economists possess a blind faith in the beneficence of its working. Seeking to
question the functioning of the market has become the equivalent of heresy,
permitting the exclusion of all who do so from the debate on policy. This is a very
strong claim. The objection is perhaps more that the language and values of
economics are privileged in this debate, and that only those who are willing to adopt
these can participate fully in it.
Jenkins alleges that this alleged idolatry can be seen in the elevation of the
observation of the terms of debt contracts to a sacred duty. Peters (1996) notes that
certain officials of the multilateral financial institutions argued that their articles of
association prevented their remitting debts. It is curious that none of the critics has
pointed to the extent to which those holding conservative political beliefs frequently
argue that any deviation from the rule of law as it is currently constituted would have
disastrous, if not truly apocalyptic, consequences.6
In part, that might be a result of the more robust theological critics, such as Duchrow
(1994), Gorringe (1994), Selby (1997) and Northcott (1999), simply sidestepping
debate and preferring to engage in self-described prophetic witness. Proclaiming that
the blood of the poor cries out against the manifest injustices of the system that
continues to enslave them, Duchrow and Gorringe construct a reading of the Old
Testament that emphasizes the degree of solidarity of the writers with the poor and
oppressed, arguing for the construction of very different kinds of economic relations,
for which they are able to offer only preliminary sketches.
Selby questions the use of language surrounding indebtedness, arguing that we
encourage both individuals and nations to ‘take credit’ and think the same way about
our borrowing when we are in control of the situation, but prefer to talk about ‘falling
into debt’, when borrowing becomes unmanageable. Selby argues that such language
carries with it a presumption of negligence and culpability, allowing those of us who
are more fortunate to exclude troubled debtors and require them to atone. In that
context, Northcott (1999) is particularly interesting as he offers a counter-history of
                                                
6 Such arguments are used by Easterly (1999), Allen and Weinhold (2000) and Menzies (2000) as
being the potentially undesirable result of overly rapid debt cancellation. These authors suggest the
need for conditionality and commitment technology to ensure that debt cancellation is a unique
event, capable of achieving the objective of restoring countries to sustainable growth.6
the debt crisis that is grounded both in Biblical prophecy and in the witness of those
suffering the oppression of living in poor, deeply indebted countries at the present
time. This is a particularly interesting approach, and while it is not written with an
academic audience in mind, it is compelling in its immediacy.
The distinction made already between usury and the hiring out of productive capital at
reasonable cost may help to clarify the matter. The problems of HIPCs are so severe,
and the wealth of developed countries so great that insistence upon repayment at least
risks being seen as usurious. For such reasons, there has been virtually global
agreement that something like a HIPC Initiative is necessary.7 Recall that the total
indebtedness of all low- and middle-income countries is approximately 12 per cent of
OECD income. OECD countries have the capacity to make transfers that are very
large relative to the size of recipient economies. Economists have provided some very
good arguments suggesting that this should occur. But they are also well aware of the
need to regulate such flows in order to ensure that they are used for the purposes for
which they are intended.
3 Debt cancellation as a component of development assistance
We argue that it is sensible to treat debt cancellation as simply one element in a
process of development assistance, adducing a number of reasons to suppose that it
will be a very efficient use of resources. We consider that it is necessary to restrict the
granting of assistance to those cases in which governments are able to use the
resources released effectively, noting the possibility that premature release of
resources may enable governments that are not committed to maintaining the process
of reform necessary to foster economic growth to delay acting in the interests of their
populations. In terms already introduced, we could argue that we wish to promote
euergetic or beneficent relations between both rich and poor nations and between
rulers and the populace of poor countries.
3.1 The need for reform of development assistance
Within economic analysis, the problem of severe indebtedness has frequently been
analysed as one of debt overhang, as developed in the models of Krugman (1988) and
Sachs (1989). In this approach, the costs of servicing debts contracted in the past are
so high that potential lenders are unwilling to make further advances because of the
risk of default. Sachs et al. (1999) has addressed the specific problems of the HIPCs
within this framework. We shall discuss at length below some of the limitations of
this model as an analytical base in this context.
Considering the slightly more general problem of making the most effective use of
development assistance, much debate has take place on the problem asserted in the
title of Collier (1997), ‘The Failure of Conditionality’. At present, programme lending
                                                
7 It is perhaps important in this context to recognize that the HIPC Initiative was developed by the
multilateral financial institutions in the mid-1990s prior to the launching of the global campaign for
debt cancellation. The debate is not over the need for debt cancellation, but rather over its political
modalities.7
is generally based upon a complex web of conditions, particularly where lending is
intended to facilitate economic adjustment. Killick (1995, 1997) argues that
conditions tend to agglomerate over time so that they become increasingly invasive
and pervasive, reducing the autonomy of debtor states.
Both the nature and the form of conditionality appear to be problematic. Kanbur
(2000) identifies a number of routes in which extreme dependence upon external
assistance conditional upon the adoption of particular policies leads to aid
dependence, to the detriment of good governance. For example, debtor states tend to
have to account to a quite remarkable number of external agencies, each of which is
helping to fund projects or programmes. There is very little co-ordination among
donors and creditors, so the debtor must deal with each one separately. Such
arrangements impose a very heavy burden on the limited resources of poor states and
represent an important distortion of their political economy.
Collier argues forcefully that all of this effort in making development assistance
dependent upon conditions has failed. There is now a body of work suggesting that
the effectiveness of aid in supporting development depends upon the quality of the
policy environment within the debtor state, with aid tending to be used to achieve
economic and social objectives effectively where the policy environment is good, as
defined by the index of quality due to Collier and Dollar (1999). They find that the
pattern of development assistance does not reflect the ability of countries to apply it
effectively. This would not matter if high levels of aid, whether or not accompanied
by the extensive conditionality currently used, tended to support policy improvement.
However, there is no evidence of this happening. Indeed, as Collier and Gunning
(1999) emphasize, while development assistance does tend to increase with the
quality of the policy environment to some extent, across the range of environments
that tend to be most supportive of development, it tends to taper out.8
                                                
8 A number of explanations for the divergences from the ‘optimal aid distribution’ of Collier and
Dollar (1998, 2001). Rodrik (1999) argues that poor economic performance is often associated with
social conflict. Expanding upon the model of Alesina and Drazen (1991), he attempts to explain
delay in policy reform, which is proximately costly but ultimately beneficial. Donors might believe
that in continuing to support governments whose policies are weak they prevent social conflict
escalating. Certainly, many of the countries receiving the highest levels of development assistance
tend to be recovering from civil war, a time in which Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that there is
a grave risk of social fragmentation.
On the other hand, Alesina and Dollar (2000) examines the pattern of development assistance from
the point of the donors, and has found that the large donors—the UK, the USA, France and Japan—
tend to use it to support their own strategic objectives. Thus the USA makes huge payments to
countries in the Middle East, France and the UK support former colonies, and Japan supports
countries that are allied with it in its international objectives, such as the campaign to rehabilitate its
whaling industry. Among these countries, only the UK discriminates in favour of democracies (and
even then quite weakly) and countries that have effective policies. Other donors, particularly the
more generous donors seem to be rather more discriminating, ensuring that their aid flows to those
countries where it is likely to be used effectively. Collier (1997) considers cause and effect in this
matter: whether it is that more efficient use of development assistance makes it easier to establish
the sort of coalition necessary to obtain the substantial increases that development economists wish
to see; or that having a large development assistance budget leads to more effective oversight on the
part of donor governments.8
This failure of conditionality in the form that it has developed in the last fifteen years
appears to result from lenders and donors experiencing the Samaritan’s dilemma.9
Suppose that a donor wishes to attain an outcome in which the domestic government
is uninterested. The classic example of this is the mixture of economic and political
reform that the international community has allegedly been sponsoring in Kenya. It is
well known that when international agencies sought to restrain what they considered
to be President Moi’s unsustainable economic policy in the mid 1990s, he responded
by threatening to reverse political reforms. Following Collier (1997), we may well
want to question just who was supposed to be benefiting from such reforms.
We might also note that in behaving in this way, Kenya is nothing if not strategically
astute. On no less than five occasions, it has managed to secure funding for more or
less the same package of agricultural reforms. Either these have not been
implemented, or else, once implemented they have been reversed at the end of the
programme and the monitoring period. The problem is that donors wish reforms to
take place and so make access to funding conditional upon implementation. But
reforms only become irreversible if the political class of the countries concerned
wishes to sustain them.
There is of course a large literature in political economy about the design of social
structures and institutions that sustain and promote continued reform and economic
and social development. The papers in Collier and Patillo (2000) examine a number of
mechanisms for making commitment to reform both credible and more permanent.
They indicate the scale of the challenge involved in ensuring that institutional
structures in poor countries are reformed so that they can fully benefit the people of
the country. However, having noted the existence of this literature, I shall not
comment further upon it here.
The counterpart of strategic behaviour by debtors is the willingness of creditors to
accommodate payment indiscipline. Kanbur (2000) argues, based on his experience as
the World Bank’s representative in Ghana during the transition from military rule to
democracy, that the institution’s apparent strength in being the major creditor of these
countries tends very quickly to be undermined.
As part of the transition, the outgoing regime agreed to a large increase in the salaries
of civil servants, which was not part of the programme agreed with the World Bank.
Kanbur therefore suspended the programme pending further negotiations.
Immediately, he came under pressure to sign a waiver that would permit the
restoration of the programme. Interestingly, this pressure came not only from the
Ghanaian government and NGOs, but also from foreign-owned private companies,
many of which would not be able to obtain further credit for their operations unless
the World Bank programme was resumed. These were soon followed by the
development assistance departments of a number of donor countries, of which one of
the largest was the most vociferous for the interesting reason that the suspension
occurred close to a financial yearend and funds committed but not spent would be lost
permanently without resumption of the programme. Lastly, World Bank project
lending (to specific sectors of the economy) was also suspended, so that pressure for
resumption was also exerted from within the Bank’s executive board.
                                                
9 For relevant applications, see Coate (1995).9
The necessary waiver was soon agreed with the World Bank accepting the decision of
the Ghanaian government. Note that even countries such as Ghana and Uganda,
whose policy stance is generally considered to be appropriate, have to obtain waivers
permitting deviation from the terms of agreed adjustment loans very frequently,
though rarely are these to cover situations severe enough to merit suspension of the
programme. Killick (1997) reports that waivers tend to be granted eventually in
almost all cases. In other words, no matter the nature of the agreement between the
World Bank and the debtor state, where the country is unable to meet the terms
agreed, they will be varied to permit the discharge of funds. One result of this is that
while only 65 per cent of projects remain on track during their lifetime, over 98 per
cent of funding is released. However, Sachs et al. (1999) argue that it is inappropriate
simply to look at totals in this way. As in the case of Ghana, delay in releasing funds
can distort the economy severely. Planning in a situation where cash flow is uncertain
becomes almost impossible. Where policy is weak and delays in making funds
available are frequent, disruption can be very severe.
This commentary suggests that the ineffectiveness of the policy of the multilateral
financial institutions vis-à-vis  the HIPCs is a result of their inability to enforce
discipline on countries with poor policy. This problem is exacerbated, if Devarajan
et al. (1999) are correct, by the extent of fungibility of aid in Africa. They suggest that
with the exception of support for large infrastructure projects, such as road building,
aid is almost entirely fungible, so that the inflow of funds is effectively reallocated
across elements of the budget. This is important, for it means that governments use
aid to increase their total resources, rather than reducing domestic taxation, as has
been suggested by some earlier authors. But it also follows that governments will
allocate their total expenditure according to their priorities. So project lending to a
priority area for donors—such as education—may permit the financing of an
increased defence budget. This suggests a further channel by which conditionality can
be undermined: the simple relaxation of the government’s budget constraint permits it
greater freedom to allocate resources.
3.2 The use of development assistance
In pure accounting terms, debt cancellation under the HIPC Initiative is really a form
of development assistance. Creditors agree that they will maintain current levels of
aid after the debt reduction agreed under the Initiative. So inflows to debtors should
not change, while outflows are reduced, increasing the resources available to the
country. It seems that this would be a very useful form because of the extent to which
debtor indiscipline is associated with invasive and crude oversight of the debtors’
economies, reducing their autonomy. Debt cancellation seems likely to be useful in
the context of an increase in resource transfers, and debtor states would probably wish
it to be offered.  Important and valuable as it is, it should only be seen as one part of a
much wider process.
Accepting this logic, in papers such as Kanbur (2000), Meltzer et al. (2000), and
Sachs et al. (1999), economists have proposed debt cancellation programmes going
some way beyond current proposals. However, it would be too simple to claim that
there is a consensus among economists on the process of debt cancellation. Easterly
(1999) is the pained response of one of the World Bank’s most thoughtful economists
to the extension of funding of the original HIPC Initiative in June 1999. He argues10
that debtor states continuing to fund government programmes through borrowing
demonstrate a very high rate of inter-temporal substitution. Such governments would
be likely to borrow excessively to fund current consumption, and fail to pay sufficient
attention to the costs of adjusting future consumption when debt repayments fall due.
Slackening such a government’s inter-temporal budget constraint through debt
cancellation would lead to further borrowing, and further demands for debt
cancellation. This argument emphasizes the similarities between debt cancellation and
other forms of development assistance. Where it is made available in unreformed
environments, it will not be used effectively.
Collier and Dollar (2000) refine their measure of the optimal distribution of aid. They
argue that by altering the distribution (increasing efficiency by reducing the marginal
cost of poverty reduction) and then increasing the flow of aid (until the marginal cost
of poverty reduction is restored to the present level), significant increases in the pace
of poverty reduction could be achieved. Relating this work to the International
Development Goals, specifically the objective of reducing the number of people
living in absolute poverty10 it would be possible to come close to achieving the IDGs
by the target date of 2015 even in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, under the current
aid distribution, there would be very little progress in this region. The scale of their
proposals can be seen in that whereas full cancellation of debt would offer the
equivalent of doubling the present flow of aid for about three years, they argue that
aid flows should be doubled more or less for the whole of the period until 2015.11
A rather different approach to this question is to be found in Bloom and Sachs (1998).
This examines the natural disadvantages that Africa suffers and concludes that
geographical factors are particularly important. Bloom and Sachs consider the greater
than usual population dispersion in Africa, the extent and nature of malarial infection
and the low productivity of agriculture to be key factors, and argue that the first of
these is partly a response to the others. They therefore advocate not only an increase
in the flow of aid, but also in its composition, to enable it better to address the needs
of countries in the region.
This is an area in which further research is necessary. If aid is generally fungible, and
conditionality is ineffective in constraining the behaviour of governments, then
donors and creditors have to be disciplined in allocating support through channels so
that it might be used effectively. This may seem obvious, but it has some challenging
implications. It would mean, for example, not providing the greatest assistance where
there is apparently the greatest need because of the limited absorption capacity of
countries in need of stabilization. It may also require, as suggested by Meltzer et al.
(2000), reforms of the multilateral financial institutions to reduce and regularize their
responsibilities, and so to increase their credibility as agents of change.
                                                
10 Absolute poverty is defined as having an income of less than one US dollar per day, valued in 1985
terms.
11 Collier and Dollar carry out an interesting exercise for Uganda, arguing for an immediate doubling
of aid, and further significant increases in support over the next few years so that aid flows would
peak about 2008, but thereafter decline quite rapidly to zero in about 2013 as the country graduates
from its current state of poverty.11
3.3 The strange public silence of economists
We believe that economists have played a surprisingly small role in the public debate
on debt cancellation. We offer three reasons. Firstly, as a profession, we are unable to
say many things that are sufficiently simple. Second, there are other problems in
economics that are more tempting, and third, partly a result of the second, we have
developed ways of thinking about sovereign debt problems that may not take
sufficient account of the precise circumstances of the HIPCs.
Turning to the first of these criticisms, the lack of simple things to say, this is not just
a matter of living in a world of soundbites, in which only an idea that can be
expressed in thirty seconds is admissible into public discourse. Following Krugman
(1995), it is more a result of a distinction between ‘the professors’ and the ‘policy
entrepreneurs.’ The professors, Krugman suggests, are most interested in discourse
amongst themselves, caring very little for what people outside of the economics
profession might think of them. No matter the circumstance, they will follow the rules
of their internal debate, eschewing anything that might be judged to be vulgar
populism. The policy entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are quite happy to peddle
simple solutions to complex problems that permit them to collect large fees for books,
interviews and articles. Unlike the professors, they are not constrained by the rules of
academic enquiry.
Of course, this is not a new criticism. Plato, in a number of his dialogues, has Socrates
demolish the pretensions of Sophist philosophers, whom he characterizes by their love
of show and of tuition fees, rather than true seeking after virtue. But let us concede an
unwillingness amongst academic economists to commit themselves to clear positions
in public debate. The driver, I suspect, is less the desire to maintain some sort of
intellectual purity than the constraints of our present research environment in which
academic advancement is only possible through well founded (if not well funded)
research activity.
Our second reason for supposing that economists have had little to contribute is rather
more speculative. Work on debt cancellation first became important in the 1980s
when a number of Latin American countries threatened to default upon debt
payments. Compared with HIPCs, these countries have large economies, considerable
debt management abilities and extensive assets. Consequently, they were able to
contract debts large enough for their default to have a considerable impact upon the
global economy. The threat of default led to large-scale debt management plans
sponsored by US Treasury Secretaries Baker and Brady. Note, however, that the
purpose of these plans was to permit debtors once again to have access to global
financial markets and to raise new borrowing.
In contrast, the comparatively small economies of the HIPCs tend to lack functioning
capital markets and investment institutions, and, even if they are very severely
indebted according to a debt-to-GDP ratio, are small debtors in absolute terms. Many
of them have not been able to raise funds through capital markets for many years, and
their borrowing is now dominated by bilateral and multilateral official debts. Their
default would not have the same global repercussions as that of large middle-income
debtors.12
When we searched the Econlit database for articles containing the terms ‘debt’ and
‘Latin America’ in either the title, the abstract, or in keywords, we found 723 articles
since 1983, the year after the Latin American debt crisis began. A similar search for
the terms ‘debt’ and ‘Africa’ yields 300. Dividing the period 1983-2001 into three
year segments, the peak period for publication on Latin America was 1989-91, with
199 publications. In contrast the peak period for Africa was as late as 1995-97, with
82 publications. In no period did the rate of publication on Africa exceed that of Latin
America, suggesting that the problems of the highly indebted poor countries, which
have emerged over the last twenty years, have never attracted as great a concentration
of effort on the part of economists as did those of Latin America.
Our last concern is that the standard economic model of debt overhang does not
capture the nature of the problem in HIPCs. Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989)
devised this model in the context of the Latin American debt problem. It therefore
assumes the institutional structure typical of middle income countries with access to
global financial markets to raise funds. The debtor experiences an unfavourable state
of the world, so that projects already begun do not generate the expected cash flow.
Potential investors, therefore, expect the country to have difficulties in servicing debt
repayments as they fall due. They, therefore, anticipate a default in which all of the
country’s debts will be affected. Consequently, new projects are unlikely to attract
external financing since potential creditors will expect to receive only a dividend
rather than full repayment. Upon reaching an agreement with existing creditors to
write down the outstanding debt and refinance existing debts, new projects will again
appear to be viable and so external funding will resume. Cancellation in association
with new lending increases the surplus of the creditor, ensuring benefits both to
creditor and debtor. Such a process allows countries to obtain many of the benefits of
bankruptcy proceedings in commercial law, but through a process more akin to a
voluntary composition with creditors.
An analogy with commercial bankruptcy might be quite useful. In UK law, there are
two very different types of court-directed processes for the recovery of debts,
receivership and liquidation.12 Receivership offers a company protection from
creditors while it reorganizes its business and its financing, although as noted below,
it is initiated by creditors (unlike a Chapter 11 filing) for their benefit. It enables a
company that has a viable business, but which is currently illiquid, to return to
profitability. Liquidation takes a number of different forms, but the main use is to
wind up the assets of a company that is no longer able to trade profitably. It is,
therefore, appropriate where the firm would not be able to meet its commitments to
creditors in the future, were it allowed to continue trading, even after a financial
restructuring. In many cases where a receiver is appointed by a creditor, the court will
later need to confirm him as a liquidator, acting on behalf of all creditors in final
winding up of the company’s affairs.
In this context, Schaffer (1998), studying the role of reorganization and winding up
procedures in the context of transition in Eastern Europe, uses operating profit as a
criterion of enterprise viability, suggesting the following policy rule for dealing with
formerly state owned enterprises. Those making net profits are plainly viable; those
making operating profits but net losses after financing costs are potentially viable, but
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need assistance through reorganization; and those making operating losses are simply
unviable and should be shut down. Another way of examining this problem would be
to ask whether enterprises add value through their use of inputs.
Viability has to be determined over a period of time, rather than at a point in time. A
company can continue trading while insolvent, although in the UK, it is a criminal
offence for its directors to permit this, since they know that there is at least a risk that
they will not be able to repay their creditors. While an insolvent company will have
negative net assets and so would be unable to meet all of its obligations in full either
now or at any point in the future, it will continue to have assets which it can use to try
to trade out of its present difficulties. For example, a company that has lost a major
source of revenue because of unfair competition by a competitor may seek to continue
trading, even though its only hope of a return to viability is in the successful outcome
of a court case seeking damages from the competitor.
In the case of the HIPCS, their exclusion from primary capital markets and their
consequent dependence upon external financing in the form of grants and
concessional loans, as documented in World Bank (2000), together with the well-
known arguments about the failure of conditionality, presented by Killick (1997),
Collier (1997) and Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995), suggest that this is not a simple
matter of a debt overhang. Rather, there is a problem more akin to insolvency.
More appropriate models, reflecting our understanding of the failure of conditionality,
might build upon the idea of soft budget constraints.13 Among HIPCs, strong
payments discipline is associated with low dependence upon external funding, and the
virtual elimination of soft funding through the use of debt arrears and debt
reschedulings. In Mochrie (2000), I have used such data to argue that there is debtor
control of lending relationships, with HIPCs able to influence the terms of borrowing
considerably, rather than having to accept the terms offered by public institutions.
While further work is necessary to substantiate the robustness of this conclusion, it is
certainly consistent with Easterly’s hypothesis that HIPCs have often been treated
rather leniently.
Pushed to its limits, the analogy with corporate insolvency could have a rather
uncomfortable conclusion. Suppose that all of the debts of a state were to be
discharged, and the state were to be so riven by social conflict that it would most
likely once again become deeply indebted or else collapse. Such a state could
reasonably be described as being unviable. Pushing the analogy to its very limit, we
might wonder if such states should be wound up, with their assets being acquired for
other purposes. For many reasons, we seem to be unwilling to contemplate this
possibility. However, the logical conclusion of following it through would be for
some other country or group of countries to acquire the territory of the bankrupt state,
perhaps rather as the Reich was dismembered by the victorious powers in 1945,
seeking to restore civil government where it has collapsed. Perhaps some of the
conflicts that we observe in Africa at the present time can be explained at least in part
as piecemeal, private attempts to undertake such projects.
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4 Conclusion
We have sought to explain some of the differences between theological and economic
understandings of deep indebtedness, and also to explore some of the reasons for the
debate being inconclusive. We believe that the disciplines proceed from very different
assumptions, use very different forms of argument and apply very different standards
of evidence. Economists seeking to resolve this problem attempt to assess the extent
to which the policies of multilateral financial institutions provide the sorts of
incentives that foster growth and poverty reduction. Theologians tend to object to this
instrumentalist approach, arguing that other objectives such as justice or dignity are of
greater importance, and are not necessarily congruent with increased wealth. The
language of economic analysis makes an implicit claim for its priority, arguing that
we may dispose of ethical or social considerations, and arguing for the sufficiency of
measures of wealth.
Good—or preferred—outcomes will be those in which poverty is reduced. This
reveals an understanding of justice that is essentially restorative and private, since
reduction in poverty might be considered to involve giving (back) to people lacking
rights or property that they need to enter into full humanity. Poverty is then absolute,
being deprivation of the material or the rights necessary to live a certain kind of life,
or to achieve a threshold utility. So a central theme within this kind of work is the
derivation of poverty lines, such as the well known dollar per day at 1985 purchasing
power or a calorific entitlement based approach.
The opposite would be an understanding of justice that is both distributive and public.
This entails locating the individual within a society. Poverty is then a state of relative,
rather than absolute, deprivation of entitlements. It occurs where individuals are
unable to take on acceptable roles within the society that they find themselves, so that
they suffer alienation. Forrester (1997) argues powerfully for such a construction,
claiming that apparently absolute measures of poverty tend to be culturally specific.
Forrester also argues that a reduction in poverty is good not only because it enables
people to overcome exclusion and alienation from the rest of society, but also because
we should prefer the type of society that seeks to reduce poverty. It is difficult to
contain such arguments within neoclassical economics which proceeds on a basis of
methodologically individualist utilitarianism, examining individual, egotistical
decisionmaking whose object is to maximize personal well-being.
Even if it is not methodologically innocent to proceed on the assumption that poverty
reduction and growth are legitimate objectives of macroeconomic policy, it may still
be reasonable. Statistical measures of inequality for many countries are quite stable
over time, although sudden changes tend to be increases, rather than reductions, in
inequality. Given increasing evidence that for poor countries the adoption of
economic reforms entrenching market-oriented outcomes through institutional change
are likely to have only limited (but generally positive) effects upon levels of
inequality, and will tend to restore economic growth, then we might expect these to
attract widespread support.
Recent developments within the economics literature have, therefore, suggested a
very clear direction for future policy, associated with a considerable increase in the
extent of resource transfer from rich to poor countries and substantial changes in the
nature of the relations between states. Debt cancellation has been identified as one of15
the most effective forms of transfers, so long as it is limited to states whose policy
environment enables it to be applied effectively. Its value stems from the particularly
detailed codes of behaviour to which debtors are required (at least to appear) to
conform. These debilitate governments, making it more difficult for them to
implement reform successfully. They also distort the political process, so that the
executive is scrutinized for its ability to extract funds from creditors, rather than for
more substantive achievements.
We do not wish to be critical of the theological tradition, which is much older than
that of economics, and which still provides perhaps the most effective vehicle for the
representation of the concerns of ordinary citizens of HIPCs to the multilateral
financial organizations. But we do come back to the problem of commensurability.
Economists consider this to be a period of ‘normal science’, in which they are
gradually working out responses to a series of policy questions. The theological
seeking of justice does not challenge the positive arguments of economics, but their
application to a normative purpose, the defence of social arrangements that benefit
those of us who live in wealthy countries. Economists believe that in the long run
market-oriented systems will eradicate absolute poverty. Theologians seem to share
Keynes’ attitude to that distant horizon.
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